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LIBERALIZING MARYLAND'S APPROACH TO PIERCING 
THE CORPORATE VEIL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the uncertain odds of success in the business world, the 
corporate form of organization is fundamental for the protection of 
the personal assets of Maryland investors. 1 With the potential for a 
business entity to put its shareholders at risk of contract or tort 
liability, a corporation's characteristic oflimited liability is extremely 
attractive to investors.2 Nevertheless, shareholders may be surprised 
to learn that limited liability does not shield them from the 
obligations of a corporation as fully as state statutes would make it 
seem, especially after seeing the rate with which state and federal 
courts will "pierce the corporate veil" and make shareholders 
personally responsible for a corporation's liabilities.3 While many 
states use "piercing the corporate veil" as a protection for individuals 
in contract and tort claims against the abuse of the corporate shield, 
"Maryland views [it] as only a theoretical remedy."4 
Piercing the corporate veil5 is a muddled doctrine that state courts 
have had trouble devising any consistent and reliable approach to, 
which is alarming given that "[ v ]eil-piercing is the most heavily 
litigated issue in corporate law .... "6 Different state courts have 
developed a range of approaches to determine whether a 
corporation's veil should be "pierced," which has led to unpredictable 
1. G. Michael Epperson & Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate 
Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of 
Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 605, 605 (1988). 
2. /d.; see infra Part II. "Long the hallmark of corporate status, limited liability protects 
a corporation's shareholders from personal responsibility for corporate obligations. 
This means that a creditor who has a claim arising out of a transaction with the 
corporation may not look to a shareholder for payment even if the corporation is 
insolvent." David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and 
the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1309 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
3. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 605. A shareholder is one who owns a share, 
which represents ownership interest, in a company. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1500 
(9th ed. 2009). 
4. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 605. 
5. See i'lfra Part III. 
6. Millon, supra note 2, at 1307; see Denise L. Speer, Comment, "Piercing the 
Corporate Veil" in Maryland: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 14 U. BALT. L. 
REv. 311, 311 (1985). 
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outcomes among different jurisdictions. 7 Maryland is unique 
compared to the rest of the United States because Maryland courts 
adhere to a strict approach that permits piercing the corporate veil 
"only to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity."8 On the 
contrary, other states' courts use various different factors in deciding 
whether to pierce the corporate veil-<>ften referred to as 
"disregarding the corporate entity-and are thus more lenient in 
doing so."9 In fact, Maryland is considered to have the most stringent 
requirements, thus rendering it the state in which piercing the 
corporate veil proves most difficult. 10 
This comment explores the consequences of Maryland's strict 
approach to piercing the corporate veil, and provides an in-depth 
comparison to other states' approaches. 11 Specifically, this comment 
defines and discusses the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as 
well as the doctrine of limited liability, which is followed by a 
summary of different veil-piercing tests employed by select states. 12 
Next, this comment looks at Maryland's approach and evaluates it 
through an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of a 
strict standard to piercing the corporate veil. 13 Finally, this comment 
suggests a fresh and reasonable approach for the Maryland courts that 
considers new and different factors, along with other states' 
approaches, to formulate the best veil-piercing standard for 
Maryland. 14 The overarching goal of this comment is to demonstrate 
the need for a more liberal veil-piercing approach in Maryland to 
better protect individual rights. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
A fundamental principle of corporate law is that the "corporation" 
is a creation of the state and is meant to operate as a legally 
recognized business entity, independent from its shareholders, to 
7. See Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 612; infra Part V. 
8. Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 653, 382 A.2d 893, 899 (1978) (quoting 
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 312, 340 A.2d 225, 235 
(1975)); Speer, supra note 6, at 311-12; see infra Parts V-VI. The term "paramount 
equity" will be discussed in Part VI of this comment. 
9. See Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 132-34 (2010); Speer, supra note 
6, at 311; infra Part V .. 
10. Oh, supra note 9, at 117. 
11. See infra Part VII. 
12. See infra Parts II-V. 
13. See infra Parts VI-VII. 
14. See infra Part VIII. 
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promote economic activity in the marketplace. 15 Thus, the 
corporation's actions and value are separate from its shareholders, 
allowing the corporation to act as a shield to protect the personal 
assets of the investors from the liabilities of the corporation. 16 
According to the doctrine of "limited liability," a corporate 
shareholder can lose no more than the amount they invested in the 
corporation in the event of a business failure. 17 Thus, limited liability 
is a primary reason for incorporating a business, and in effect, it shifts 
some of the risks of operating a corporation away from its 
shareholders. 18 Furthermore, it is entirely legal to incorporate a 
business solely for the purpose of limiting shareholder liability. 19 
Shareholder limited liability allows capital investment to flourish 
and assists corporations in the accumulation of large amounts of 
money by making investment attractive to investors. 20 At the same 
time, limited liability minimizes the exposure of shareholders' 
personal assets to the everyday risks of doing business.21 
Nevertheless, some scholars criticize limited liability protection by 
arguing that it encourages excessive risk-taking by allowing 
shareholders "to avoid the full costs of their business activities while 
reaping the full economic reward of such activities.'.zz 
III. CORPORATE LAW AND "PIERCING THE CORPORATE 
VEIL" 
Piercing the corporate veil is an exception to the default rule in 
corporate law of shareholder limited liability protection. 23 "Although 
15. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 606 ("[The corporatipn] is endowed with 
attributes designed to make it a convenient and cost-effective form in which to operate 
a business."). 
16. See Millon, supra note 2, at 1309; 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (2010) ("A 
corporation is treated entirely separate from its shareholders even where one 
individual owns all of the stock."). 
17. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 606; Thomas K. Cheng, Form and Substance of 
the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 80 MISS. L.J. 497, 501 (2010). "[L]imited 
liability has been called the most attractive feature of [the] corporation." 114 AM. 
JUR. 3DProofofFacts § 1 (2010). 
18. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL 
L. REv. 1036, 1040 (1991). 
19. See I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED 
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 18 (Beard Books 2000) (1927). 
20. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 606-07. 
21. /d. at607; 114AM.JUR.3DProofofFacts§ 1 (2010). 
22. J. William Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability and Veil Piercing, 58 Bus. LAW. 
1063, 1063 (2003). 
23. Cheng, supra note 17, at 502. 
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the limited liability offered by legal entities serves important public 
policy goals, there are times when strict adherence to the doctrine 
would bring about inequitable results."24 In such cases, a court will 
"pierce" the "veil" of the corporation, disregard the shareholders' 
privilege of limited liability, and provide a remedy to a contract 
creditor or a tort victim.25 Once the veil of the corporate entity is 
pierced, the shareholders are personally responsible for corporate 
liabilities because the court determines that "the liability in question 
'is not really a debt of the corporation, but ought, in fairness[,] to be 
viewed as a debt of the individual or corporate shareholder or 
shareholders. "'26 In other words, courts will use the equitable 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to disregard the separate 
personality of the corporation and to hold shareholders liable for the 
acts or obligations of the corporation to the extent that liability is 
unmet after a corporation becomes insolvent.27 
Accordingly, limited liability protection for shareholders may in 
fact be ignored if a court finds that particular factors are met by a 
corporation's actions, usually determined on a case-by-case basis.28 
Since this common law remedy is discretionary and there are 
numerous approaches by state courts, this doctrine has turned out to 
be incoherent, and a case-by-case application is difficult and 
dubious.29 Courts have had much trouble in determining when a 
creditor has successfully crossed the threshold in defeating limited 
liability and reaching a shareholder's personal assets; as a result, 
many different approaches have been developed across the country.30 
With the strong policy reasons urging businesses to incorporate 
coupled with the need to respect a business' decision to incorporate, 
courts' decisions to pierce the corporate veil are often unpredictable, 
and likewise, courts' reasoning for doing so is often unclear. 31 Since 
piercing the corporate veil is an exception to a primary reason for 
incorporating a business, "courts addressing the issue are often 
24. 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 1 (2010). 
25. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 608-09. 
26. In re Payroll Exp. Corp., 216 B.R. 344, 361 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting STEPHEN 
B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL§ 1.01, at 1-6 (1998 West Group (1991)). 
27. See 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ I (2010); Cheng, supra note 17, at 526. 
28. Cheng, supra note 17, at 503-04. 
29. Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 612. 
30. Oh, supra note 9, at 81; see also infra Parts V-VI. 
31. See Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 612. ''Not surprisingly, veil-piercing has 
been decried as an ... 'incoherent' doctrine whose 'ambiguity and randomness' 
resembles 'lightning, [in that] it is rare, severe, and unprincipled."' Oh, supra note 9, 
at 85. 
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caught between the conflicting goals of preserving the corporate 
entity and affording relief to the victim."32 
In Peter B. Oh's study33 on veil piercing, he found that the overall 
veil-piercing rate is 48.51%, which demonstrates that plaintiffs and 
defendants are almost equally successful in tried cases.34 Many 
courts use metaphors to describe a theory or test when deciding 
whether to pierce the corporate veil.35 The test that is seen most often 
in court decisions is known as the "alter ego test," and requires that 
the plaintiff prove that the corporation was an "alter ego" of the 
shareholder-i.e, that the shareholder had "complete control" of the 
corporation and used the corporation to defraud or cause an injustice 
against a victim.36 Courts are continually changing their veil-piercing 
tests by adding new factors to be considered in their determination, 
and there is no one significant factor that is dispositive. 37 
Furthermore, state courts rarely explain how both the old and new 
factors are to be weighted in their veil-piercing decisions.38 The most 
successful veil-piercing rationale involves evidence of fraud or 
misrepresentation.39 The other factors most frequently considered by 
courts in their analyses are commingling of assets, shareholder 
control or domination, injustice or unfairness, non-observance of 
corporate formalities,40 and undercapitalization of the corporation.41 
State courts have fashioned their own veil-piercing tests by using a 
variety of these factors and assigning different weights to the ones 
they choose to incorporate.42 
"In theory, the doctrine of limited liability extends with equal force 
to all variations on the corporate form," but in practice, closely held 
32. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 612. 
33. Oh, supra note 9, at 81 ("With the dataset of 2,908 cases from 1658 to 2006, this 
study presents the most comprehensive portrait of veil-piercing decisions yet."). 
34. Jd. at 107. From a sample of the years 2000-2006, the successful veil-piercing rate 
was 49.40% of 502 cases. See id. at 109. 
35. Jd. at 83-84. 
36. Jd. at 84 ("The inherent imprecision in metaphors has resulted in a doctrinal mess."). 
37. Jd. 
38. See Millon, supra note 2, at 1327. 
39. Oh, supra note 9, at 90. 
40. Examples of a failure to observe corporate formalities are "when shareholder 
meetings or directors' meetings are not held[,] . . . when decisions are made by 
shareholders as though they were partners, when the shareholders do not sharply 
distinguish between corporate property and personal property, [or] when corporate 
funds are used to pay personal expenses." 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 13 
(2010). 
41. Oh, supra note 9, at 90. 
42. See infra Part V. 
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corporations are the most prevalent corporate veils to be pierced.43 A 
public corporation, which typically includes a significant number of 
shareholders, has never had its corporate veil pierced because of the 
number of dispersed and unattached shareholders, which prevents the 
level of control necessary to justify veil piercing that is exemplified 
in veil-piercing cases of close corporations.44 Courts understand that 
the ability to disregard the corporate entity should happen only in 
very rare cases, yet they will not allow shareholders to abuse this 
privilege by injuring others and then hiding behind the corporate 
shield.45 
IV. TORT VERSUS CONTRACT CREDITORS 
Some commentators argue that courts should be more willing to 
pierce the veil of a corporation in tort cases rather than in contract 
cases because a party will be careful in investigating and 
understanding the finances of the business when it enters into a 
contract.46 Arguably, if the party has had this opportunity to 
understand all potential risks of the contract agreement and has had 
the ability to protect themselves, they should not later be able to 
pierce the veil of that partner if there is a breach of the contract.47 On 
the other hand, in tort cases, the injured party is considered an 
involuntary creditor because they had no prior dealings with the 
corporation.48 As a result, the shareholders of a corporation "are in a 
position to shift some of the social costs of their business activity 
onto members of the public who have not agreed to bear those 
costs."49 
In fact, plaintiffs are indeed more successful in veil-piercing cases 
that involve tort claims rather than contract claims.50 Depending on 
43. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 613. As of 1997, no case of piercing the 
corporate veil had more than nine shareholders. 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 3 
(2010). 
44. See Oh, supra note 9, at 110. 
45. 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 3 (2010). 
46. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 632-33. 
47. !d. at 633. 
48. !d. For example, "[a] pedestrian hit by a taxicab ... has not agreed to assume the risk 
of corporate insolvency and shareholders' limited liability." Millon, supra note 2, at 
1316. 
49. Millon, supra note 2, at 1316. 
50. Oh, supra note 9, at 90. "The results evince that veil-piercing claims prevail more 
often when they concern an involuntary (52.83%) versus a voluntary (47.50%) 
creditor." !d. at 141. However in Maryland, courts have allowed veil-piercing claims 
to consistently prevail more often in contract cases rather than tort cases. Epperson & 
Canny, supra note 1, at 634-35. 
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whether the litigant brings a contract or tort claim, certain factors will 
be more helpful to them in establishing a veil-piercing claim.51 First, 
for example, fraud or misrepresentation are critical factors in contract 
cases; if a plaintiff can prove those elements, then the litigant has a 
much better chance of bringing a successful veil-piercing claim.52 
Furthermore, other important factors for contract litigants in 
successful veil-piercing claims are excessive shareholder control, 
failure to observe corporate formalities, and undercapitalization. 53 In 
contrast, plaintiffs in tort claims have a higher rate of success when 
demonstrating the corporation is involved in financial wrongdoing, 
especially if there is evidence of undercapitalization of the 
corporation.54 Although financial misconduct, specifically 
undercapitalization, is a significant factor for tort claims, courts use 
evidence of inadequate capitalization as a factor comparably as often 
in both contract and tort claims. 55 This is somewhat surprising since 
the sufficiency of capital would seem to be more relevant in tort 
claims because the injured party did not have the prior opportunity to 
investigate the business entity and to protect themselves. 56 
V. DIVERGING APPROACHES TO PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL IN THE UNITED STATES 
Courts in different states have developed differing standards, but it 
is important to note "this is an area of law where courts adopt 
differing approaches even within jurisdictions."57 As a result, 
potential defendants to veil-piercing claims may forum shop and 
choose a state with a more favorable veil-piercing standard. 58 At the 
same time, an opportunity may be offered to potential plaintiffs to 
evaluate where to commence a veil-piercing suit. 59 
This section of the comment looks at five states' approaches to veil 
piercing: Virginia, California, Delaware, New York, and 
Pennsylvania. The veil-piercing approaches employed by these states 
will be used in this section of this comment as a means of comparison 




55. /d. at 90. "[T]he focus [of inadequate capitalization] has expanded to include whether 
there was sufficient capital at the time of the alleged misconduct or ... if assets had 
been siphoned for a shareholder's own use." /d. at 98-99. 
56. /d. at 90. 
57. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 614. 
58. Oh, supra note 9, at 113. 
59. See Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 642. 
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to the current Maryland approach. Comparing the approaches used 
by Virginia, Delaware, and Maryland is particularly important 
because those states, situated in such close proximity to one another, 
compete for the same businesses.60 Additionally, Delaware is the 
state with the best-developed general case law on corporations.61 
Pennsylvania, California, and New York were selected to give a 
diverse look at veil-piercing approaches from around the country. In 
fact, New York, California, and Pennsylvania are three of the top five 
producers of veil-piercing cases-due to each state's wide-reaching 
economy consisting of numerous corporations-so they have had 
ample opportunity to develop case law on this subject.62 
A. Virginia 
Virginia courts usually begin their analysis by stating that the 
decision to ignore "the separate existence of a corporation and 
impos[ e] personal liability on shareholders for debts of the 
corporation is an extraordinary act to be taken 'only when necessary 
to promote justice. "'63 Virginia courts continue to demonstrate that 
piercing the corporate veil is an extraordinary remedy because 
Virginia, along with Maryland, is one of three states to have a veil-
piercing rate of less than 33.33%.64 In fact, Virginia's veil-piercing 
rate is 29.09%.65 Virginia courts have explained that there is "no 
single rule" or approach that can be used when determining whether 
to pierce the veil of a Virginia corporation,66 but have held that it is 
important to look at all of the specific actions of the corporation in 
question. 67 
Nevertheless, recent cases suggest that Virginia follows a two-part 
analysis to decide whether disregarding the corporate entity is 
justified.68 Virginia courts will pierce the corporate veil "when the 
unity of interest and ownership is such that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and the individual no longer exist"; in other words, 
the corporation is the alter ego or "dummy" of the individual, and a 
60. See id. 
61. See Oh, supra note 9, at 116. 
62. See id. at 115-16 tb1.6. 
63. O'Hazza v. Exec. Credit Corp., 431 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1993) (quoting Cheatle v. 
Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 360 S.E.2d 828,831 (1987)). 
64. See id.; Oh, supra note 9, at 115. 
65. Oh, supra note 9, at 116 tbl.6. 
66. 0 'Hazza, 431 S.E.2d at 320. 
67. /d.at321. 
68. See, e.g., Millisor v. Anchor Point Ventures, L.L.C., No. CL08-114, 2008 Va. Cir. 
WL 8201369, at *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2008); Brooks v. Becker, No. 219257,2005 
Va. Cir. WL 832211, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2005). 
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shareholder has used the corporation to perpetrate fraud, to commit a 
crime, or to cause an injustice.69 With the two-part test, "Virginia 
adheres to a rigorous standard requiring proof that the defendant" 
shareholder abused the privilege of the corporation by hiding his or 
her inequitable actions. 70 No single factor is dispositive for Virginia 
courts, but instead they will look at numerous factors in their veil-
piercing decisions. 71 In fact, Virginia cases demonstrate that there 
does not need to be evidence of any fraud for Virginia courts to 
pierce the corporate veil. 72 
Undercapitalization is a major factor that Virginia courts will look 
to in determining whether to pierce a corporate veil to avoid an 
injustice. 73 For example, in Dana v. 313 Freemason/4 the court 
observed whether the shareholders deliberately undercapitalized the 
corporation and if that was the reason for the unsatisfied judgments 
by the corporation. 75 In this case, when Freemason Associates, Inc. 
sold their building to individual unit owners, the shareholders knew 
that their condominium building's roof consistently leaked from the 
time of its installation as a result of structural defects.76 The 
shareholders formed the corporation to decrease liability and to 
protect their personal assets since they knew about the defective roof 
as they tried to sell the property. 77 The court found that the evidence 
showed there was a "unity of interest" between the shareholders and 
the corporation through the absolute control of the business by the 
shareholders.78 The court noted that "[t]he apparent inability of. .. 
[the corporation] to satisfy the judgment against it in this case was 
not the result of poor business decisions . . . or unexpected 
liabilities ... [but instead] because of the deliberate acts of the 
incorporating stockholders."79 Therefore, the corporation 
69. C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P'ship, 580 S.E.2d 806, 809-10 (2003) (quoting 
Greenberg v. Commonwealth ex ref. Attorney Gen. ofVa., 499 S.E.2d 266, 272 (Va. 
1998)); Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 
548 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 360 
S.E.2d 828,831 (Va. 1987)). 
70. Perpetual Real Estate, 974 F.2d at 548. 
71. Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 627. 
72. /d. 





78. /d. at 554. 
79. /d. 
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insufficiently capitalized from the outset.8° Furthermore, all 
corporate funds were deposited into a shareholder's personal 
checking account.81 The highest court in Virginia held that it would 
be unjust to allow the shareholders to assert the protection of the 
corporate shield because of the reason for their incorporation and 
knowledge of the defects in the roof; and accordingly, the court 
decided that this was an example of an extraordinary case to allow a 
corporate veil to be pierced. 82 
B. California 
Similar to Virginia's test, the leading case in California gives a 
two-part test that California courts call the alter ego theory.83 First, 
there must be such "unity of interest and ownership [between the 
corporation and its equitable owner] that the separate personalities of 
the corporation and the individual no longer exist."84 Secondly, there 
must be an inequitable result from failing to pierce the corporate 
veil.85 An example of satisfying the first prong is shareholder control 
or "domination" of the corporation, which essentially only occurs in 
closely held corporations.86 
In Automotriz, 87 the plaintiff-seller filed an action against the 
defendant-buyers "for the balance due on the price of eight 
automobiles" sold to the defendants.88 The court held that 
defendants' corporation, which allegedly purchased the automobiles, 
did not issue any stock or even apply for a permit to issue corporate 
stock.89 Further, the trial court found no evidence of the defendants 
contributing to the equity of the firm, despite the defendants' 
testimony saying otherwise.90 The state's highest court held that the 
trial court was not wrong in considering many different factors, 
including the non-issuance stock and the inadequate capitalization of 
the corporation from its inception, in determining whether defendants 
80. ld. 
81. !d. 
82. !d. at 555. 
83. Automotriz Del Golfo De Cal. S. A. de C. V. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal. 1957). 
84. /d. at 3. 
85. !d. 
86. Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal 
Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 853, 854-55 (1982) [hereinafter Alter Ego 
Doctrine]. 
87. Automotriz, 306 P.2d I. 
88. !d. at 2. 
89. !d. at 3. 
90. !d. 
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were personally liable to the plaintiff. 91 Ultimately the court decided 
to disregard the corporate entity.92 In its decision, the highest court of 
California implicitly acknowledged that the fact that the corporation 
was being closely held coupled with the failure of any issuance of 
stock, was sufficient to satisfy the first requirement of the two-part 
test.93 Furthermore, the undercapitalization established the second, 
"inequitable result," part of the test.94 
According to California courts, when the corporate form of 
organization is used to defraud or for other inequitable means, the 
courts will "deem the corporation's acts to be those of the persons ... 
actually controlling the corporation, in most instances the equitable 
owners."95 Similar to Virginia, California's alter ego doctrine also 
does not require a showing of actual fraud, but the California courts' 
goal is to use the veil-piercing doctrine to prevent the potential 
injustices of sham corporations if they are allowed to carry on their 
dealings in the marketplace.96 
Although California maintains that the alter ego test "is an extreme 
remedy [that is] sparingly used,"97 this does not appear to be the case. 
Plaintiffs in California have a successful veil-piercing rate of 50.86% 
of tried cases. 98 Commentators argue that California's relatively high 
veil-piercing rate is due to a "liberal standard" for veil piercing,99 as 
the state looks at limited liability as a "statutory privilege" to be used 
for "legitimate business purposes."100 Also, another reason that 
91. See id. at 4. 
92. /d. 
93. See id. at 3-4; STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL§ 2:5 (2011). 
94. See Automotriz, 306 P.2d at 4 ("If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the 
business to be done and the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the separate 
entity privilege."); PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:5. Disregard of corporate formalities 
is another factor considered in satisfying either prong of the alter ego test. Associated 
Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962). In 
Associated Vendors, the court listed about fifteen factors that were important in past 
court decisions under particular circumstances in each case, which could then be used 
to satisfy either part of the test. !d. at 813-15; see PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:5. 
95. Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 538 (2000). 
96. Associated Vendors, 210 Cal. App. 2d at 838; 15 CAL. JUR. 3D Corporations § 24 
(2012) ("The issue is not so much whether ... the corporation was organized for the 
purpose of defrauding the innocent party, as it is whether justice and equity are best 
accomplished in a particular case, and fraud and unfairness defeated, by disregarding 
the distinct entity of the corporate form."). 
97. Sonora Diamond Corp., 83 Cal. App. 4th at 539. 
98. Oh, supra note 9, at 115. 
99. !d. at 119. 
100. !d. (quoting Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1985)). 
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California is known as one of the states most likely to disregard the 
corporate entity is perhaps in part because of the California courts' 
use of a corporation's undercapitalization as a factor in the 
determination. 101 
C. Delaware 
The state of Delaware and its judiciary have much expertise in 
corporate law, and Delaware is considered to have the "best-
developed general case law on corporations, owing to the efforts of 
the state legislature to create a flexible system that would favor 
managers and shareholders, and to the fact that so many important 
national corporations now are incorporated in the state."102 As a 
result, with the number of corporations that choose to incorporate in 
Delaware, one might expect the veil-piercing cases involving 
corporations from Delaware to be plentiful, and in tum, the veil-
piercing case law in Delaware to be well-developed. 103 However, 
there has not been a large number of veil-piercing cases in Delaware, 
arguably due to the fact that many publicly traded organizations, for 
which veil piercing has never occurred, prefer to incorporate in 
Delaware, along with other sophisticated incorporators that have a 
better understanding of corporate and veil-piercing law. 104 
Accordingly, other states have had more opportunities to fashion 
particular veil-piercing approaches as compared to Delaware, but 
Delaware has a strict requirement of "fraud or something like it" that 
makes it relatively tough to pierce the veil in the state. 105 Conduct 
that is "something like fraud" would normally "involve matters of 
contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or otherwise present 
101. /d. at 118-19. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in a 
1988 decision that "the California Supreme Court has held that undercapitalization 
alone will justify piercing the corporate veil." Nilsson, Robins, Dalgarn, Berliner, 
Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1544 (9th Cir. 1988). This 
conclusion seems to be wrong, however, as there has never been a California case 
· where evidence of undercapitalization, standing alone, has supported piercing the 
corporate veil. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:5; see Associated Vendors, Inc. v. 
Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 841-42 (1962) ("Evidence of inadequate 
capitalization is, at best, merely a factor to be considered by the trial court in deciding 
whether or not to pierce the corporate veil. To be sure, it is an important factor, but 
no case has been cited, nor have any been found, where it has been held that this 
factor alone requires invoking the equitable doctrine [of piercing the corporate veil] .. 
. . "). 
I 02. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:8. 
103. Oh,supranote9,at 116. 
104. /d. 
I 05. /d. at 116-17; see PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:8. 
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compelling equitable considerations."106 Other than requiring fraud 
or something like it, Delaware courts rarely explain in detail their 
reasoning behind a decision to pierce the veil of a Delaware 
corporation. 107 
Delaware has a low 34.29% veil-piercing rate. 108 However, the 
Delaware Chancery may be changing its veil-piercing approach to a 
more liberal one109 because, in a few cases, "the Delaware courts 
have countenanced veil piercing in instances other than those strictly 
involving fraud or similar conduct."110 One factor that has served as 
a foundation for a successful veil-piercing claim in Delaware was a 
disregard for corporate formalities and other similar inequitable 
conduct. 111 
Furthermore, Delaware court decisions have focused on the alter 
ego theory in their veil-piercing analyses as an alternative reason to a 
finding of fraud in the strict sense. 112 According to the Delaware 
Court of Chancery, the alter ego analysis looks at factors such as 
"whether the corporation was adequately capitalized[,] ... [whether] 
corporate formalities were observed[,] ... and whether, in general, 
the corporation simply functioned as a fa~ade for the dominant 
shareholder."113 Even federal court opinions interpreting Delaware 
law have stated that there is no strict requirement of fraud under the 
alter ego theory. 114 Yet, in a 2005 case, the Court of Chancery noted 
that Delaware courts have added a required element of fraud to the 
106. Fredric J. Bendremer, Delaware LLCs and Veil Piercing: Limited Liability Has Its 
Limitations, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 385, 391 (2005). 
107. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:8. 
108. Oh, supra note 9, at 115. 
109. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:8; see Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784,793 
(Del. Ch. 1992) ("[A] court can pierce the corporate veil of an entity where there is 
fraud or where a subsidiary is in fact a mere instrumentality or alter ego of its 
owner."). But see Case Fin., Inc. v. Alden, No. 1184-VCP, 2009 WL 2581873, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2009) ("There also must be an element of fraud to justify piercing 
the corporate veil."). 
110. Bendremer, supra note 106, at 391. 
111. !d. 
112. !d.; see Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Geyer, 621 
A.2d at 793) ("Delaware law permits a court to pierce the corporate veil of a company 
'where there is fraud or where [it] is in fact a mere instrumentality or alter ego of its 
owner."'). 
113. Mason v. Network of Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 19434-NC, 2005 WL 1653954, at *3 
(Del. Ch. July 1, 2005). 
114. Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1457 ("Thus, under an alter ego theory, there is no requirement of 
a showing of fraud."). 
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alter ego analysis in contract cases. 115 In that case, the Court of 
Chancery stated that "[p ]iercing the corporate veil under the alter ego 
theory requires that the corporate structure cause fraud or similar 
injustice . . . [and] the corporation must be a sham and exist for no 
other purpose than as a vehicle for fraud." 116 Although the Delaware 
Chancery has stated and demonstrated that there is no single veil-
piercing test that has been created in Delaware, they have held that 
"our courts have only been persuaded to 'pierce the corporate veil' 
after substantial consideration of the shareholder-owner's disregard 
of the separate corporate fiction and the degree of injustice ... " 
plaintiffs would endure if the court refused to pierce the corporate 
veil. 117 Despite the difficulty in stating a clear test given by the 
Delaware Chancery, recent cases demonstrate, and commentators 
have suggested, that Delaware is slowly moving away from being 
known as very protective of the corporate entity to a state that will 
more likely pierce the corporate veil. 118 
D. New York 
With Delaware being a favorable state for businesses to incorporate 
in, New York competes with Delaware for corporations; as a result, 
New York has been described as being reluctant, or "nearly 
impregnable," to pierce the corporate veil. 119 However, this 
description is contrary to New York's veil-piercing rate of 49.81%, 
which demonstrates New York corporations have their veils pierced 
almost half the time in tried cases. 120 In general, to pierce the 
corporate veil in New York, litigants must prove that "the individual 
defendants (1) exercised complete dominion and control over the 
corporation, and (2) used such dominion and control to commit a 
fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in injury."121 
More specifically, a shareholder will be liable for the acts of the 
corporation when the corporation is simply a "dummy" and a liability· 
shield for the shareholders to pursue their own personal business 
115. Mason, 2005 WL 1653954, at *2-3. 
116. /d. at *3 (quoting Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999)). 
117. Midland Interiors, Inc. v. Burleigh, No. CIV.A. 18544, 2006 WL 3783476, at *3 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 19, 2006). 
118. Oh, supra note 9, at 117 n.l91. 
119. /d. at 120. 
120. See id. 
121. Samuel L. Hagan II, P.C. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 28859/10,2011 WL 
4975311, at *19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 19, 2011). This is sometimes called the 
"instrumentality theory." See Speer, supra note 6, at 315. 
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instead of the business of the corporation. 122 Along with Virginia and 
California, under New York law, it is possible for a corporation's veil 
to be pierced even absent fraud to prevent an injustice.123 
Port Chester Electrical Construction Corporation v. Atlas124 is 
"one of the most frequently cited cases" in New York.125 Sol Atlas 
was in the business of acquiring and developing real property. 126 
"Atlas organized his various ownership and construction ventures 
into a complex network of separate corporations in which he had both 
a controlling interest and an active leadership role."127 An electrical 
subcontractor on a past Atlas construction project commenced a suit 
because it was unable "to collect a money judgment it obtained 
against an Atlas-controlled general contractor" for extra work the 
subcontractor performed. 128 The subcontractor was unable to obtain 
the judgment from the general contractor because Atlas moved the 
assets of the general contractor to other allied corporations to prevent 
the subcontractor from collecting any money, and thus the general 
contractor was made "virtually judgment proof."129 
The Court of Appeals of New York did not pierce the corporate 
veil in this case and held that the "separate corporate identities were 
at all times maintained."130 The highest court in New York decided 
that the complete control of the corporations by one shareholder was 
not enough, by itself, to disregard the corporate entity.131 The court 
noted that the shareholder Atlas "carefully respected the separate 
identities of the corporations, and each corporation was pursuing its 
separate corporate business, rather than the purely personal business 
of Atlas .... "132 Here, the court was looking for additional 
inequitable actions along with the shareholder control in order to 
justify piercing the corporate veil. 133 
122. Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 656-57 (1976) (quoting 
Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418 (1966)). 
123. Campone v. Pisciotta Servs., Inc., 930 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
124. Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Atlas, 357 N.E.2d 983 (1976). 
125. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:35. 




130. !d. at 986-87. 
131. !d. 
132. !d. 
133. See id. 
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E. PennsylVania 
Pennsylvania courts routinely state that "there is a strong 
presumption in Pennsylvania against piercing the corporate veil" and 
protecting the corporate form of organization. 134 However, the 
court's notion that there is a "strong presumption" against veil 
piercing "may be aspirational"135 since veil-piercing claims using 
Pennsylvania law are successful in 44.44% of tried cases. 136 
Recent Pennsylvania veil-piercing opinions state that there is no 
"specific two- or three-pronged" test to determine whether to pierce 
the veil of a Pennsylvania corporation as seen in other states' 
approaches. 137 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has, however, set 
out a list of non-exhaustive factors to be considered in veil-piercing 
decisions, including "undercapitalization, failure to adhere to 
corporate formalities, substantial intermingling of corporate and 
personal affairs, ... use of the corporate form to perpetuate a fraud," 
and shareholder domination. 138 Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts are 
"basically concerned with determining if equity requires that the 
shareholders' traditional insulation from personal liability be 
disregarded and with ascertaining if the corporate form is a sham, 
constituting a fa<;ade for the operations of the dominant 
shareholder."139 Shareholders will risk losing their limited liability 
shield if they disregard corporate formalities and use the corporation 
as a dummy to further their own personal interests instead of the 
corporation's interests. 140 Lastly, again in Pennsylvania, there is no 
requirement of fraud to pierce the corporate veil, but veil piercing is 
necessary whenever an injustice needs to be avoided. 141 
134. F1etcher-Harlee Corp. v. Szymanski, 936 A.2d 87, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (quoting 
Lumax Indus., Inc. v. Aultman, 543 Pa. 38, 41 (1995)). 
135. Oh, supra note 9, at 119 n.208. 
136. !d. at 115-16. 
137. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:42; see Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 936 A.2d at 95 ("[T]here 
appears to be no clear test or well settled rule in Pennsylvania ... as to exactly when 
the corporate veil can be pierced and when it may not be pierced.") (quoting 
Advanced Tel. Sys., Inc. v. Com-Net Prof! Mobile Radio, 846 A.2d 1264, 1278 
(2004)). 
138. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 936 A.2d at 95 (quoting Lumax Indus., 543 Pa. at 42). 
139. !d. at 96. 
140. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:42. 
141. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 936 A.2d at 96. 
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VI. MARYLAND'S APPROACH TO PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL 
837 
Maryland veil-piercing law has been described as "inordinately 
protective of limited liability for shareholders."142 Maryland has a 
strict rule that a corporation in its state will be pierced only "to 
prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity."143 However, despite 
this claim, no "equitable interest" has been brought before the 
Maryland courts that they felt was more important than shareholder 
limited liability protection. 144 Thus, the Maryland courts provide 
shareholders a "bright line" test: even if a corporation completely 
disregards all corporate formalities, the only possibility of piercing 
the veil of a Maryland corporation is if there is a proven act of 
fraud. 145 Even better for shareholders is the fact that Maryland courts 
seem to make the fraud requirement more difficult to satisfy as 
compared to other states by requiring a showing of "clear and 
convincing proof."146 
Accordingly, Maryland has the "honor" of being the jurisdiction 
that is least likely to allow a plaintiff to be successful in a veil-
piercing claim by having not only the strictest standard but 
correspondingly the lowest veil-piercing rate of any state in the 
country. 147 According to Oh's study, until2006, veil-piercing claims 
prevailed 25.81% of the time, but this percentage includes both state 
and federal courts in Maryland. 148 According to research for this 
comment, Maryland state courts have only pierced the veil twice in 
sixteen attempts, giving plaintiffs a successful veil-piercing rate of 
12.35%, which demonstrates federal courts are applying a more 
liberal standard to Maryland veil-piercing law than state courts. 149 In 
142. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 637. 
143. Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 654, 382 A.2d 893, 899 (1978) (quoting 
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295,312, 340 A.2d 225,235 
(1975)). 
144. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 621. 
145. Id. at 637. It also seems Maryland has rejected the "instrumentality" justification for 
piercing the corporate veil that is sometimes recognized in other jurisdictions. 
Ramlall v. MobilePro Corp. 202 Md. App. 20, 32, 30 A.3d 1003, 1010 (2011). 
146. See Colandrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 428, 401 A.2d 480, 484 (1979); 
Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 626 n.l04. Maryland courts even acknowledge 
that they are more restrictive in applying the standard than other jurisdictions. See 
Ramlall, 202 Md. App. at 32, 30 A.3d at 1010. 
147. Oh,supranote9,at 117. 
148. See id. at 115. 
149. Id. Sixteen cases were found that related to the question of whether the Maryland 
court was going to pierce the veil of a corporation. See Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip. 
838 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
fact, Maryland state courts have not disregarded the corporate entity 
since 1979.150 This should not be surprising, as it seems Maryland 
courts embrace the fact that piercing the corporate veil under 
Maryland law is very difficult and have warned potential plaintiffs 
that it is a "herculean task" to bring a successful claim. 151 
Maryland courts support the privilege of shareholder liability 
protection from corporate obligations and thus are strict in their 
approach of requiring actual fraud by the corporation to disregard the 
corporate entity. 152 Maryland courts do not carefully scrutinize 
closely held corporations or consider the absence of corporate 
formalities as an essential factor. 153 Furthermore, "attempts to 
expand the standard to permit a mere showing of a need 'to enforce a 
paramount equity' apparently have failed." 154 
Co., 378 Md. 724, 738-39, 838 A.2d 1204, I2I2-13 (2003); Starfish Condo. Ass'n v. 
Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 693, 7I8-I9, 458 A.2d 805, 8I8-I9 (I983); Bart 
Arconti & Sons, Inc., 275 Md. at 309-13, 340 A.2d at 233-236; Damazo v. Wahby, 
259 Md. 627, 633-34,270 A.2d 8I4, 816-I7 (1970); Lopez v. Lopez, 250 Md. 49I, 
502-03, 243 A.2d 588, 594-95 (I968); William Danzer & Co. v. W. Md. Ry., I64 
Md. 448, 457, I65 A. 463, 466-67 (I933); Carozza v. Fed. Fin. & Credit Co., 149 
Md. 223,236-37, 13I A. 332,337 (I925); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete 
Pile Co., I41 Md. 67, 8I-86, 118 A. 279, 284-86 (1922); Ram/all, 202 Md. App. at 
32-33, 30 A.3d at 1010; Turner v. Turner, I47 Md. App. 350, 429, 809 A.2d I8, 64 
(2002); Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126 
Md. App. 294, 310, 728 A.2d 783, 791 (I999); Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 91 Md. App. I23, I59, 603 A.2d 130I, 1319 (I992); Co/andrea, 42 
Md. App. at 426-27, 40I A.2d at 483-84; Dixon, 38 Md. App. at 654-56, 382 A.2d at 
899-900; United Elec. Supply Co. v. Greencastle Gardens Section III L.P., 36 Md. 
App. 70, 77-8I, 373 A.2d 42, 46-48 (1977); Quinn v. Quinn, II Md. App. 638, 647-
50, 276 A.2d 425, 430-3I (197I). This percentage does not even account for the 
number of claims that may not be brought due to Maryland's strict veil-piercing 
standard. 
150. See Hildreth, 378 Md. at 738-39, 838 A.2d at 1212-13; Starfish Condo. Ass'n, 295 
Md. at 7I8-I9, 458 A.2d at 8I8-I9; Ram/all, 202 Md. App. at 32-33, 30 A.3d at 
IOIO; Turner, I47 Md. App. at 429, 809 A.2d at 64; Residential Warranty Corp., 126 
Md. App. at 3IO, 728 A.2d at 79I; Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 
Inc., 9I Md. App. 123, I59, 603 A.2d 130I, 13I9 (1992); Co/andrea, 42 Md. App. at 
426-27, 40I A.2d at 483-84. 
I 51. Oh, supra note 9, at 117 (quoting Dixon, 38 Md. App. at 645-46, 382 A.2d at 895) 
("[W]oe unto the creditor who seeks to rip away the corporate fa~ade in order to 
recover from one sibling of the corporate family what is due from another in the belief 
that the relationship is inseparable, if not insufferable, for his is a herculean task."). 
152. Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 625. 
I 53. /d. at 625-26. 
154. Oh, supra note 9, at 118 (quoting Residential Warranty Corp., 728 A.2d at 789 
("Despite the proclamation that a court may pierce the corporate veil to enforce a 
paramount equity, arguments that have urged a piercing of the veil 'for reasons other 
than fraud' have failed in Maryland courts.")). 
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In Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc./ 55 for example, 
general contractor Ames-Ennis, Inc. (Ames-Ennis), having three 
separate building construction contracts, subcontracted Bart Arconti 
& Sons, Inc. (Arconti) to do "masonry and related work" on each of 
the buildings. 156 Problems arose between Arconti and Ames-Ennis 
when each declared the other to be in breach of their contractual 
agreement. 157 While the two sides went to trial, the Board of 
Directors, completely dominated by two principals, Bart and George 
Arconti, decided to "lie dormant" and stop operations until the 
contractual dispute with Ames-Ennis was resolved. 158 Arconti was 
the leading corporation of the three controlled by Bart and George 
Arconti. 159 While Arconti ceased to operate, the other two 
corporations' values increased, but they were using the same 
construction equipment of Arconti without giving compensation, 
were managed at the same place of business as Arconti, and shared 
the same workers. 160 Bart and George were also the sole shareholders 
of the three corporations during their operation. 161 
The trial court held "that the purpose of these activities had been to 
'evade legal obligations devolving upon (Arconti)"' while the lawsuit 
was ongoing, which "resulted in rendering Arconti 'all but 
insolvent. "'162 The trial court "found that Bart and George, as the 
dominant directors and sole shareholders of all three corporations," 
purposely attempted to make Arconti judgment-proof through 
insolvency while using the other two corporations for their 
subcontracting operations. 163 Accordingly, the trial court found that 
piercing the corporate veil of Arconti was justified to make George 
and Bart personally liable for corporate obligations.164 Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeals reversed stating that it was "[unaware] of any 
Maryland case" where the court decided to pierce the corporate veil, 
"absent evidence of fraud or similar conduct," simply "because it 
wished to prevent an 'evasion of legal obligations' .... "165 Instead, 
the court stated that the narrow test, and "[t]he common thread 
155. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975). 
156. Id. at 297, 340 A.2d at 227. 
157. Id. at 302, 340 A.2d at 230. 
158. Id. at 304, 340 A.2d at 231. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 304-05, 309, 340 A.2d at 231, 234. 
161. /d. at 304, 340 A.2d at 231. 
162. /d. at 305, 340 A.2d at 231. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 311-12,340 A.2d at 235. 
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running through the Maryland cases[,] ... is that the corporate entity 
will be disregarded only when necessary to prevent fraud or to 
enforce a paramount equity."166 
In Dixon v. Process Corporation, 167 two investors, Dixon and Litty, 
attempted to pierce the corporate veil of The Process Corporation 
(TPC), a subsidiary corporation of Process Incorporated of Maryland 
(PIM), in order to collect a judgment Dixon and Litty had obtained 
against the parent corporation PIM. 168 PIM had eleven subsidiary 
corporations for the purpose of limiting the liability of PIM, and PIM 
managed all affairs of its subsidiaries and owned all of the 
subsidiaries' equipment. 169 Furthermore, all of the corporations had 
the same board of directors. 170 Dixon and Litty purchased and 
invested in a large tract of land to be developed by TPC, entering into 
an agreement where PIM would repurchase the tract from Dixon and 
Litty within one year. 171 Due to lack of funds, the repurchase did not 
occur and PIM failed to satisfy the confessed judgments against it. 172 
Dixon and Litty argued that PIM and TPC were the "alter ego" of 
Garland, the controlling principal of both corporations, and thus the 
veils of the corporations should be disregarded. 173 Litty and Dixon 
felt that "Garland's domination of the corporations for his personal 
ends, without regard to their separate corporate identities, should not 
shield TPC from liability in equity for the actions ofPIM."174 
After considering a range of various veil-piercing factors in 
determining whether a subsidiary corporation is a "mere 
instrumentality" of the parent corporation and examining how the 
corporate formalities of PIM and TPC were disregarded, the court 
held that "there was legally sufficient evidence to cast doubt as to the 
separate corporate identities of PIM and TPC."175 "The court noted 
that under the 'instrumentality rule' employed by some 
jurisdictions ... [the facts of this case] might be enough to pierce the 
veil" if brought in another state. 176 Nevertheless, the court held that 
166. !d. at 312, 340 A.2d at 235. 
167. Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893 (1978). 
168. !d. at 644, 382 A.2d at 893. 
169. !d. at 646-47, 382 A.2d at 895. 
170. !d. 
171. !d. at 647-48, 382 A.2d at 896. 
172. !d. at 649, 382 A.2d at 896-97. 
173. !d. at 651, 382 A.2d at 897. 
174. !d. at 651, 382 A.2d at 898. 
175. !d. at 653-54, 382 A.2d at 899. 
176. !d. at 652-53, 382 A.2d at 898; PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:21. Garland "testified 
that the directors for the corporations were the same, the stock of PIM was paid for 
but not issued, PIM owned all the equipment used by its subsidiaries, hired their 
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the lack of corporate formalities and the "instrumentality test" were 
insufficient reasons for piercing the corporate veil, and that the lower 
court "expressly found that there was no fraud and that no paramount 
equity was present .... "177 The court firmly stated, "We make clear 
that the rule of law in [Maryland] is that no matter how flimsily 
woven is the corporate curtain, it may not be flung aside except to 
prevent fraud or enforce a paramount equity."178 There was no clear 
and convincing proof of fraud to pierce the corporate veil. 179 
Co/andrea v. Colandrea180 is an example of one of the rare times a 
Maryland court chose to pierce the corporate veil of a Maryland 
corporation due to proof of fraud. 181 A married couple-Dominic 
and Carmen Colandrea-incorporated a real estate business, Cortland 
Realty, Ltd. (Cortland Realty). 182 The couple subsequently divorced, 
ended their business relationship, and Mr. Colandrea sold all of his 
stock in the corporation back to Cortland Realty as part of a stock 
redemption agreement, in return for a total of $100,000 that was paid 
yearly by seven promissory notes. 183 Three months after the 
execution of the stock redemption agreement, Mrs. Colandrea 
incorporated another business, Cortland, Ltd.-which took over 
Cortland Realty's most profitable business of real estate sales, free of 
any liabilities-and also changed the name of Cortland Realty to 
Carmen Management Company, Inc. 184 Mrs. Colandrea failed to pay 
the seven promissory notes held by Mr. Colandrea, and thus was in 
default; as a result, Mr. Colandrea brought suit to pierce the corporate 
veil. 185 After reviewing evidence of the acts of Mrs. Colandrea with 
the corporations, the court felt that "[t]he effect of all these corporate 
machinations is obvious. By it Mrs. Colandrea was able to continue 
the profitable business of Cortland Realty, Ltd. without its attendant 
obligations to Mr. Colandrea."186 
employees, ... and managed their affairs." Dixon, 38 Md. App. at 654, 382 A.2d at 
899. 
177. Dixon, 38 Md. App. at 655, 382 A.2d at 900. 
178. /d. at 656, 382 A.2d at 900. 
179. /d. at 657, 382 A.2d at 901. 
180. Colandrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480 (1979). This was the last 
time the veil of a Maryland corporation has been pierced. 
181. /d. at 433,401 A.2d at 487. 
182. /d. at 422, 401 A.2d at 481. 
183. /d. at 422-23, 401 A.2d at 482. 
184. /d. at 423,430,401 A.2d at 482,486. 
185. /d. at 423-24,401 A.2d at 482. 
186. /d. at 425,401 A.2d at 483. 
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The court found that Mrs. Colandrea's actions, as the sole 
shareholder and director, constituted proof of fraud, but required that 
the elements be shown with clear and convincing proof. 187 The court 
held that Mrs. Colandrea, at the time she executed the stock 
redemption agreement for the corporation, never intended to permit 
payment of the promissory notes, and the evidence met the all of the 
elements for fraud. 188 The court then pierced the corporate veil of 
Mrs. Colandrea's corporation and imposed personal liability upon her 
because her "dealings, through the corporation, with Mr. Colandrea, 
can be termed nothing short of fraudulent." 189 Even in recent 
decisions, Maryland courts still adhere to this strict approach. 190 
In regard to Maryland's veil-piercing standard, the Maryland Court 
of Special Appeals has explained that, absent fraud, a Maryland court 
may only pierce the corporate veil to enforce a paramount equity, 
which arises when an individual owns a "substantial" amount of a 
corporation's stock, and other factors-including undercapitalization, 
commingling of corporate and personal assets, and disregard for 
corporate formalities-exist to show an abuse of the privilege of the 
corporate form. 191 However, the intermediate appellate court has 
noted that, to date, no Maryland court has found sufficient evidence 
to justify piercing the veil based on a need to enforce a paramount 
equity, and likewise, arguments '"for reasons other than fraud' have 
failed in Maryland courts."192 And thus, while Maryland courts 
consistently insist that a veil may be pierced to enforce a paramount 
equity, it remains unclear when enforcing a paramount equity would 
be sufficiently necessary for a Maryland court to pierce the corporate 
veil independent of any fraud. 193 
187. /d. at 424,426, 401 A.2d at 483. 
188. /d. at 430, 401 A.2d at 485. The five elements proven were: 
(1) [A] material representation of a party was false, (2) falsity was 
known to that party or the misrepresentation was made with such 
reckless indifference to the truth as to impute knowledge to him, 
(3) the misrepresentation was made with the purpose to defraud 
(scienter), (4) the person justifiably relied on the misrepresentation, 
and (5) the person suffered damage directly resulting from the 
misrepresentation. 
/d. at 428, 401 A.2d at 484. 
189. /d. at 428,432-33,401 A.2d at 484, 486-87. 
190. See Ramlall v. MobilePro Corp., 202 Md. App. 20, 31, 30 A.3d 1003, 1009 (2011). 
191. Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126 Md. 
App. 294, 307, 728 A.2d 783, 789 (1999) (quoting Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc., 91 Md. App. 123, 158-59, 603 A.2d 1301 (1992)). 
192. /d. 
193. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:21; see Iceland Telecom, Ltd. v. Info. Sys. & Networks 
Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 585, 591 (D. Md. 2003) ("It is not the province of this Court, 
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Starfish Condominium 
Associaion v. Yorkridge Service Corporation, 194 indicated that absent 
fraud, a plaintiff attempting to pierce the veil of a Maryland 
corporation would need to establish "an equity which requires 
enforcement, and which is paramount to the ordinary expectation of 
limited liability on the part of the shareholder."195 One commentator 
believes that this language, if it is "broadly construed," essentially 
means that a Maryland court could pierce the corporate veil whenever 
it found "that there had been any abuse of the corporate form ... 
[that] created a paramount equity in favor of the plaintiff and against 
limited liability."196 An abuse of this kind would most likely include 
"avoidance of a statute, . . . undercapitalization, ... [and] any other 
grounds in addition to fraud that have regularly supported veil-
piercing in other jurisdictions."197 
Furthermore, in Hildreth v. Tidewater Equipment Company, 198 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland listed five factors courts may consider 
in imposing personal liability on a shareholder, and even discussed 
whether those factors were met based on the facts of the case.199 Yet 
but rather the state courts of Maryland, to flesh out and expand the factual scenarios 
that could warrant a court's piercing of the corporate veil."); Travel Comm., Inc. v. 
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 91 Md. App. 123, 158, 603 A.2d 1301, 1318 (1992) 
("Notwithstanding its hint that enforcing a paramount equity might suffice as a reason 
for piercing the corporate veil, the Court of Appeals to date has not elaborated upon 
the meaning of this phrase or applied it in any case of which we are aware."). In 
Ram/all v. MobilePro Corp., because the court had no guidance on what constituted 
"paramount equity," the court refused to impose shareholder liability based on the 
paramount equity justification. 202 Md. App. at 31, 30 A.3d at 1009-10 ("With no 
precedent approving this extraordinary remedy, we decline to pierce the corporate veil 
of CloseCall (MD) to impose liability on MobilePro based on the paramount equity 
justification."). 
194. Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 
(1983). 
195. !d. at 714,458 A.2d at 816. 
196. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:21. 
197. !d. 
198. Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip. Co., 378 Md. 724, 838 A.2d 1204 (2003). 
199. Id. at 734,736,838 A.2d at 1210-11. The five factors were: 
(1) whether the corporation is inadequately capitalized, fails to 
observe corporate formalities, fails to issue stock or pay 
dividends, or operates without a profit, (2) whether there is 
commingling of corporate and personal assets, (3) whether there 
are non-functioning officers or directors, ( 4) whether the 
corporation is insolvent at the time of the transaction, and (5) the 
absence of corporate records. 
Id. at 735, 838 A.2d at 1210. 
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the court, in adhering to Maryland's strict standard for piercing the 
corporate veil, still refused to disregard the corporate entity because it 
believed the conduct in this case was no worse than the conduct in 
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., where the court 
refused to pierce the corporate veil. 200 Nevertheless, the court's 
enunciation of these five factors could potentially be the foundation 
of a more liberal approach in Maryland veil-piercing law, and proves 
that Maryland shows promise in shifting slowly from its strict 
approach. 201 However, for now, as recent cases demonstrate, 
Maryland courts continue to apply the strict veil-piercing standard 
and continue to make it "a herculean task" for a plaintiff to overcome 
shareholder limited liability protection.202 
VII. EVALUATION OF MARYLAND'S STRICT VEIL-
PIERCING POLICY 
A. Advantages of a Strict Veil-Piercing Standard 
Before announcing this comment's suggested approach to veil 
piercing in Maryland, it is important to explain the purpose of veil-
piercing law generally, as well as the effects of utilizing such a strict 
approach. As demonstrated above, veil-piercing law would not be 
appealing to "those who like tidy doctrines that admit of easy 
application."203 However, Maryland courts come very close to 
employing a bright-line rule, as it seems judicial discretion is seldom 
applied in Maryland's veil-piercing cases, which is unusual in this 
area of law.204 A bright-line test prevents the randomness of veil-
piercing standards that is sometimes evident in a number of 
jurisdictions.205 Some jurisdictions that use a "laundry list" of factors 
fail to give any guidance regarding the weight to be assigned to any 
particular factor, making decisions unpredictable.206 Moreover, those 
who believe in a strict veil-piercing doctrine will argue that the 
privilege of limited liability is "socially desirable" and thus should be 
firmly protected.207 The strict approach and protection of shareholder 
limited liability will "spur substantial investment and long term 
200. /d. at 738-39, 838 A.2d at 1212-13. 
201. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:21 n.27. 
202. See Ramlall v. MobilePro Corp., 202 Md. App. 20, 32, 30 A.3d 1003, 1010 (2011); 
PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:21. 
203. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CoRP. L. 479, 513 (2001). 
204. See supra Part VI. 
205. See Bainbridge, supra note 203, at 506-07; supra Part V. 
206. See Bainbridge, supra note 203, at 510. 
207. /d. at 487. 
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planning on the basis of such a relatively secure and certain business 
environment."208 Accordingly, piercing the corporate veil more 
frequently would discourage investment and discourage firms from 
doing business within a certain state, which would then generate an 
overall decline in economic activity.209 
Furthermore, some commentators suggest that businesses may 
change their behavior and be "deterred from engaging in socially 
desirable activities," or may take unnecessary preventative measures 
if the risk of a potential veil-piercing claim cannot be highly 
predicted. 210 With a consistent standard, corporations "know their 
legal obligations with a high degree of certainty and are free to shift 
the burdens by contract ... on the noncorporate party."211 Thus, 
Maryland would be appealing to businesses seeking to incorporate 
because of Maryland's strict veil-piercing law and strong support of 
shareholder limited liability.212 Consequently, Maryland investors 
"can reasonably rely on the expectation that their limited liability will 
be upheld, even in a situation that would be borderline in another 
state. "213 
B. Disadvantages of a Strict Veil-Piercing Standard 
The argument that a more liberal veil-piercing doctrine would 
render Maryland's approach too vague and unpredictable-due to the 
difficulty in determining what constitutes "improper conduct"-and 
would in effect deter potential investors, is unfounded.214 No court in 
the United States has ever pierced the veil of a public corporation, but 
rather, courts have only pierced the veils of closely held 
corporations.215 Thus, public corporations, where most "passive 
[capital] investments" end up, would not be affected by a more liberal 
standard.216 Since the only people who could potentially be at risk for 
personal liability are those shareholders who perform the acts in 
question, "[p ]assive shareholders are almost never implicated, even in 
208. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 638. 
209. See id. at 637 n.l80. 
210. Bainbridge, supra note 203, at 514. 
211. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 637 n.l80 (claiming that uncertainty raises the 
cost of business by forcing parties to estimate their obligations and to act on expected 
probabilities). 
212. /d. at 638. 
213. /d. 
214. See Cheng, supra note 17, at 513. 
215. /d. 
216. See id. 
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close corporations."217 Therefore, passive investments are virtually 
not affected or discouraged by veil piercing.218 And when it comes to 
"the culpable shareholders, there should be little disagreement that 
they should be deterred," especially when most agree that the conduct 
that has led courts to disregard a corporate entity has been quite 
inequitable. 219 
Those in favor of the strict Maryland test may argue that a more 
liberal application will make Maryland courts less effective at 
deterring improper conduct because there will be less predictability in 
advance for corporations of what actions could lead to a disregard of 
their corporate entity.220 They may claim that if a standard is not 
clear, then "these [potential] perpetrators will find it difficult to adjust 
their conduct accordingly."221 However, some clearly important 
factors will remain if Maryland liberalizes its approach; for example, 
fraud would still be a highly predictive factor in Maryland veil-
piercing decisions.222 In fact, a more liberal standard to veil piercing 
may actually help a court "deter [wrongful conduct] by encouraging 
potential perpetrators to steer clear of the boundary of permissible 
conduct."223 A strict rule will allow potential unjust actors to shape 
their conduct around the veil-piercing threshold, as in Maryland 
where anything short of fraud would not result in shareholder 
liability.224 Some closely held corporations might attempt to walk the 
line of impermissible behavior. 225 
Accordingly, Maryland's "fierce protection" of the corporate shield 
and limited liability is favorable to dishonest corporations, including 
those companies that are "undercapitalized[] or mismanaged. "226 
Thus, "the kinds of businesses that are likely to incur liability [in a 
different state] may incorporate in Maryland to escape legal 
obligations."227 With confidence in a stronger liability shield, these 
types of businesses in Maryland are not as worried about engaging in 
risky and potentially harmful behavior than they would in another 




220. See id. at 548. 
221. ld. 
222. See id. 
223. ld. 
224. Jd. at 548-49; see also supra Part VI. 
225. Cheng, supra note 17, at 549. 
226. Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 638. 
227. Jd. 
228. Millon, supra note 2, at 1324--25. 
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intelligent risk-taking is important to any business and something that 
limited liability protects, an overly strict veil-piercing standard may 
also assist socially undesirable behavior.229 
A new liberal standard for Maryland would still attract legitimate 
businesses to incorporate if they feel they have "nothing to fear" from 
this new standard.230 Thus, limited liability should be limited to such 
businesses that are managed responsibly and legally?31 Additionally, 
these businesses will conduct themselves more appropriately to 
reduce the risk of a possible veil-piercing claim.232 Accordingly, new 
competent and honest corporations are exactly the type of business 
entity that would be beneficial to any state.233 
C. Maryland Should Adopt a More Liberal Veil-Piercing Standard 
Along with these positive effects, a new approach would also put 
Maryland in line with the wisdom of other states nationally, because 
Maryland is on the extreme side with their strict approach to piercing 
the corporate veil.234 Delaware, which is the leading state for 
corporation law35 and a competitor with Maryland for incorporating 
businesses/36 seems to be reconsidering its strict approach to veil 
piercing.237 As noted earlier, New York, California, and 
Pennsylvania are three of the top five producers of veil-piercing 
law, 238 and they have not adopted this strict Maryland approach. 239 
As demonstrated above, the disadvantages appear to outweigh the 
advantages of a strict veil-piercing standard.240 
Limited liability is an important business creation, but the standard 
for veil piercing should not be so strict as to be at the expense of tort 
victims and contract creditors.241 By liberalizing the standard to 
pierce the corporate veil, Maryland courts may "seek to protect 
consumers and improve their bargaining position with 
229. See id. at 1325. 
230. See Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 639 n.l85. 
231. See id. 
232. /d. at 639 n.l84. 
233. See id. at 639 n.l85. 
234. See supra Parts V-VI. 
235. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 2:8. 
236. See Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 642. 
237. See supra Part V.C. 
238. See Oh, supra note 9, at 115. 
239. See supra Part V. 
240. See supra Parts VILA-B. 
241. See Cheng, supra note 17, at 516, 550. 
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corporations."242 Tort and contract creditors will have more security 
by their increased ability to be awarded damages by Maryland courts 
after being victims of the actions of improper Maryland 
corporations.243 Accordingly, this may be a time when Maryland 
should overturn its common law veil-piercing precedent, because the 
Maryland Court of Appeals has held that precedent should be 
overturned when it is no longer useful or sensible.244 Overall, 
Maryland will ultimately benefit from a more liberal standard in their 
approach to piercing the corporate veil. 
VIII. SUGGESTED APPROACH TO PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL IN MARYLAND 
As demonstrated in the small selection of states above, Maryland 
has a unique standard for piercing the corporate veil. 245 This 
comment's suggested fix is an increased liberal standard, which will 
put Maryland law more in line with what other states are currently 
practicing throughout the country. This comment is not endorsing an 
overly lenient standard, but something more relaxed than the current 
Maryland approach. Furthermore, this comment does not argue for 
any specific two- or three-part test, such as the alter-ego theory or the 
instrumentality theory, in order to stay away from using metaphors, 
which can at times be difficult to apply.246 Instead, this comment 
recommends an examination of numerous factors, some seen in other 
jurisdictions, in evaluating the injustice of a Maryland corporation's 
actions?47 
Maryland courts should look to use other factors besides "common 
law fraud" when deciding whether to disregard the corporate entity.248 
There is a range of factors Maryland courts could use, but at the very 
least, the factors of shareholder control, adherence to corporate 
formalities, and undercapitalization should be considered in a 
decision to pierce the corporate veil to protect creditors and 
consumers and to enforce a paramount equity?49 Furthermore, 
Maryland courts should adopt a looser definition of fraud to include 
242. See Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 637 n.I80. 
243. See id. 
244. See Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of 
America, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 74-75 (2006). 
245. See supra Part V. 
246. See Oh, supra note 9, at 84; supra Part V. 
247. See supra Part V. 
248. See supra Part VI. 
249. See supra Part VI. 
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misrepresentation or actions akin to fraud that do not meet 
Maryland's strict definition of common law fraud. 250 
A. Shareholder Control 
Shareholder control is essentially the first prong under the alter ego 
and instrumentality veil-piercing tests seen in Virginia's, 
California's, and New York's approaches to veil piercing.Z51 "In 
short, there must be pervasive control exercised by the shareholders 
over the corporation. "252 This is normally demonstrated through a 
closely held corporation of nine or less shareholders, as no publicly 
traded corporation has ever had its veil pierced.253 Also, interested 
and active shareholders in a closely held corporation having 
"complete dominion" over all of the important financial and strategic 
business decisions of a corporation would demonstrate shareholder 
control.254 Furthermore, active shareholders using a corporation for 
their personal business instead of the interests of the corporation, 
such that the corporation is simply a "dummy" and a liability shield 
for the shareholders, also demonstrates pervasive control.255 This 
factor of shareholder control alone is not enough to justify piercing 
the corporate veil, but some type of injustice coupled with 
shareholder control should be a consideration to pierce the corporate 
veil in both contract and tort claims.256 If shareholder control by 
itself were enough to pierce the veil of a closely held corporation, 
"limited liability is rendered largely illusory."257 
B. Observance of Corporate Formalities 
One criterion identified by Peter Oh's study as being frequently 
applied by courts is the non-observance of corporate formalities.Z58 
Creditors sometimes may be confused about the identity of the 
250. See supra Part VI. 
251. See supra Part V. 
252. Speer, supra note 6, at 322; see 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 6 (2010). 
253. See Cheng, supra note 17, at 513; Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 86, at 854-55; 114 
AM. JuR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 3 (2010). 
254. See Speer, supra note 6, at 316, 322. 
255. 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 5 (2010); see supra Part V. 
256. See Speer, supra note 6, at 322; 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof ofFacts403, at§ 6 (2010). 
257. 114 AM. JUR. 3DProofofFacts § 6 (2010). 
258. See Oh, supra note 9, at 138. It is noted that in some instances, non-observance of 
corporate formalities has no causation between lack of formalities and harm to a 
creditor, so courts may only want to consider a lack of corporate formalities to the 
extent it leads to corporate confusion whether the creditor is dealing with shareholders 
or a corporation. 
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defendant, such as whether they are dealing with the "corporation or 
its shareholders in their individual capacity because of non-
compliance with these [corporate] formalities requirements."259 In 
such cases, "courts have been willing to find misrepresentation by the 
corporation and impose shareholder liability" because shareholders 
fail to be clear to the creditor that they are doing business with a 
corporation, which may lead to an inequitable situation.260 Veil 
piercing will thus encourage shareholders to ensure that creditors 
understand that they are dealing with the corporation and not the 
shareholders themselves.261 
The fact that Maryland courts do not look at corporate formalities 
in their veil-piercing decisions "increases the uncertainties of doing 
business with Maryland corporations."262 Since corporate formalities 
are a way to warn a creditor whether they are transacting with a 
legitimate corporation, this gives dishonest Maryland corporations 
the opportunity to deceive creditors and give less information about 
themselves than corporations in other states.263 With Maryland's 
strict approach, which does not include observance of corporate 
formalities, corporations will not fear a veil-piercing claim for failure 
to meet the formality requirements.264 Although disregard of 
corporate formalities, standing alone, should not result in shareholder 
personal liability, it is an important factor in making a case for veil 
piercing in contract claims when combined with other factors, as it is 
evidence that the corporation has no identity that is distinct from its 
shareholders.265 Including this factor in Maryland veil-piercing 
decisions will push shareholders to respect the privilege and "formal 
integrity" of the corporate entity. 266 
C. Undercapitalization 
One commentator has suggested that the main purpose of veil-
piercing law is "the prevention of the unjust enrichment of the 
shareholders at the expense of the corporation's creditors," if limited 
259. Cheng, supra note 17, at 518. 
260. /d.at518-19. 
261. /d.at519. 
262. Epperson & Canny, supra note I, at 638 n.182. 
263. /d. 
264. /d. 
265. See 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 13 (2010). Formality requirements arguably 
should not be a factor in tort cases since the victim is an involuntary creditor and did 
not have any prior dealings or opportunity to investigate the corporation. Epperson & 
Canny, supra note I, at 633. 
266. See Cheng, supra note 17, at 520. 
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liability is strictly adhered to.267 Veil piercing should focus on 
conduct that results in shareholders' unjust enrichment that ultimately 
injures creditors.268 How shareholders ultimately benefit at the 
expense of these creditors depends on whether the plaintiff at issue 
was a contract creditor or a tort creditor.269 For contract creditors, the 
unjust enrichment by shareholders is the goods or services received 
by the corporation without giving full payment for them.270 "For a 
tort victim, the main benefit will be the unpaid tort liability that 
would have compensated the victim [or] reduced accident prevention 
costs, the incurrence of which would have prevented the tort at 
issue."271 By not paying these costs, the shareholders retain the 
savings. 272 However, it is important to keep in mind that courts 
should resort to veil piercing only when the benefit to the corporation 
resulted from improper actions.273 
With this idea in mind, undercapitalization should have greater 
importance as a factor in Maryland veil-piercing decisions, since 
"inadequate capitalization" fits squarely with the purpose of 
preventing unjust enrichment of shareholders.274 Shareholders need 
to act in good faith and need to reasonably attempt to have sufficient 
capital in their corporations to account for potentialliabilities.275 If 
the corporation is not adequately capitalized, then tort and contract 
creditors' liabilities are not satisfied, and instead the shareholders 
profit by the extra capital that should have been obtainable by those 
creditors. 276 
The fact that a creditor is incapable of recovering any damages is 
not the inquiry courts examine under the undercapitalization factor to 
determine whether a corporation's veil should be pierced.277 Instead, 
since determining a proper test for capital adequacy has given courts 
trouble, Maryland courts should investigate whether a corporation 
267. ld. at 499. 
268. ld. at 499-500. 
269. ld. at 543-44. 
270. ld. at 544. 
271. ld. 
272. Jd. 
273. !d. at 545 ("If limited liability is to be upheld, the corporate veil doctrine cannot deem 
non-payment of corporate liabilities absent shareholder impropriety to be unjust. 
Otherwise limited liability would be practically overturned."). 
274. ld. at 570. 
275. 114AM.JUR.3DProofofFacts§ 16(2010). 
276. Cheng, supra note 17, at 570. 
277. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge, 
31 J. CORP. L. 1063, 1089 (2006). 
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recklessly or deliberately incurred "an obligation that grossly 
exceeded the corporation's [resources]," especially after having a 
prior opportunity to determine whether they could financially repay 
that liability.278 Furthermore, for tort obligations, the inquiry should 
depend on the "foreseeability of risk."279 Thus, shareholders would 
be acting recklessly if a corporation was initially capitalized with few 
assets, used for high-risk activities, and it is foreseeable that major 
potential liabilities will occur and are unable to be repaid.280 Overall, 
businessmen in Maryland should not be able to protect their wealth 
and use the limited liability shield to engage in potentially harmful 
activities without being able to compensate possible victims.281 
On the other hand, inadequate capitalization should not be used as a 
factor in those situations where a business loses money due to 
reasonably unanticipated events.282 "[I]f evidence shows that when 
the contractual obligation was incurred, there was at least some 
reasonable basis for the shareholders to believe that the corporation 
could generate sufficient revenue to cover the liability[,]" then this 
would not be an instance of an undercapitalization problem.283 
Essentially, corporations in Maryland should act responsibly in their 
financial decisions. 
This new factor may lead to shareholders overcapitalizing their 
businesses; however, this would be beneficial to Maryland 
corporations by reducing "the risk that a business will face a 
successful veil piercing claim[,] [b ]ut it also reduces the risk that the 
business will fail[]" since it will be adequately capitalized?84 
Although undercapitalization, by itself, may not be sufficient to 
warrant piercing the corporate veil, it should still be an important 
factor that goes into the Maryland courts' decisions in both contract 
and tort claims in denying shareholders their limited liability 
shield.285 When shareholders recklessly undercapitalize their 
278. Cheng, supra note 17, at 572, 578; see 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 16 (2010). 
279. Cheng, supra note 17, at 578. 
280. Id. 
281. See Millon, supra note 2, at 1346. 
282. See id. at 1308. 
283. Cheng, supra note 17, at 579. 
284. Rapp, supra note 277, at 1085. 
285. See 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts§ 16 (2010). It is noted that undercapitalization 
may not be an important factor in a veil-piercing case if a sophisticated creditor had a 
prior opportunity to look at a corporation's balance sheet and financial position, and 
therefore, a prior opportunity to bargain with a corporation for additional protection. 
See generally Speer, supra note 6, at 319-20. 
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corporations, "it is unjust to make an innocent plaintiff bear the cost 
of tort injury or contract breach."286 
D. Overall More Liberal Standard for Veil Piercing 
Maryland courts should relax their standard of proof of actual 
common law fraud in contract claims to include evidence of 
misrepresentation and conduct akin to fraud. Maryland courts are 
defining fraud more strictly than other states.287 In fact, at least 
compared to the states discussed in this comment, Maryland is the 
only state with a clear and convincing standard for veil piercing.Z88 
This demonstrates that Maryland should become more in line with 
the wisdom of other states and liberalize their veil-piercing standard 
because Maryland is currently on the extreme side.Z89 This would 
include Maryland courts loosening up their definition of fraud and 
lowering their burden of proof to disregard the corporate entity. 
Indeed, a corporation must be viewed as a legally recognized 
business entity independent from its shareholders, but this privilege 
must not be used in an inequitable manner.290 "There is always 
danger, when a fiction [such as a corporation] becomes so deeply 
rooted in the case law, that judges no longer remember its object and 
purpose .... "291 Under this new approach, Maryland courts would 
be able to provide injured tort and contract creditors with a better 
opportunity for compensation than is currently available for them in 
Maryland. "There may be situations in which the factors of 
undercapitalization, control, abuse of formalities, and unfairness are 
present, yet [Maryland's strict view ofJ fraud is not."292 In these 
cases, there still may be such inequitable actions, even absent fraud, 
that would justify piercing the corporate veil as comparably as under 
Maryland's current veil-piercing standard.293 Thus, Maryland courts 
should work their way to a new vision of their veil-piercing doctrine 
to protect individuals more fully when shareholders abuse the 
corporate privilege. 
286. Rapp, supra note 277, at 1089. 
287. Epperson & Canny, supra note 1, at 626 n.104 ("Maryland courts appear to construe 
the fraud requirement more strictly than in most states, where it is given an 
interpretation closer to 'unfairness' or 'inequity."'). 
288. See supra Part V-VI. 
289. See supra Part VI. 
290. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 1:5. 
291. /d. 
292. Speer, supra note 6, at 330. 
293. /d. 
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IX. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
Although the corporation is the business entity primarily focused 
on in this comment, this suggested approach could also be applied to 
a limited liability company (LLC), with a slight variation. 294 The 
LLC is an entity that "combine[s] the positive characteristics of the 
various types of business organizations, in particular the limited 
liability of corporations and the flow-through taxation of 
partnerships."295 "Maryland courts have not yet addressed whether 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies with equal force to 
LLCs."296 Nevertheless, Maryland courts should apply the doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil to the liability shields of LLCs, since 
LLCs have the same goal of limited liability for their members as 
corporations have for their shareholders.297 
Maryland courts could not apply the suggested approach to veil 
piercing exactly as discussed in Part VIII because "the LLC form 
differs from the corporate form in several respects."298 Most 
importantly, the courts in Maryland should not use failure to observe 
formalities in their veil-piercing decisions for LLCs, since LLCs are 
not required to follow formalities like corporations are obligated to 
follow. 299 In Maryland, there is flexibility in what the members can 
put in the operating agreement regarding "management and economic 
relationships of the LLC."300 Thus, "[p]iercing the veil of this entity 
294. This suggested approach may also apply to limited liability partnerships, but this 
discussion is limited to LLCs because of the growth in popularity of the LCC. See 
PRESSER, supra note 93, § 4:1. The LLC is attractive due to its characteristics and is 
the "dominant business form for small businesses." Rapp, supra note 277, at 1063. 
295. See PRESSER, supra note 93, § 4:1. Flow-through taxation allows a business to "not 
be subjected to double taxation." /d. "Thus, instead of being taxed at both the entity 
and the personal level, income is taxed only at the personal level." !d. This is a tax 
advantage as compared to corporations since they are subject to double taxation. !d. 
296. Jeffrey S. Quinn, Allen v. Dackman: Doing Away With Limited Liability in Maryland, 
70 Mo. L. REv. 1171, 1198 (2011). In Allen v. Dackman, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that an individual member of an LLC may be held personally liable for 
injuries under the Baltimore City Housing Code, but the court did not address whether 
the members would be held liable by applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil to the liability shield of LLCs. See Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132, 160, 991 
A.2d 1216, 1232-33 (20 1 0); Quinn, supra, at 1198-204. 
297. Quinn, supra note 296, at 1223-24. 
298. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 4:2. 
299. !d. Some states, not including Maryland, have rejected the observance of formalities 
as a basis for LLC veil piercing in their LLC statutes. See Bendremer, supra note 
106, at 395 n.77; but see Quinn, supra note 296, at 1198-99. 
300. Quinn, supra note 296, at 1185. "The [Maryland Limited Liability Company Act] 
was designed to provide ... flexibility in establishing the rights of its members." /d. 
at 1182. 
2013] Maryland's Approach to Piercing the Corporate Veil 855 
for a failure to observe formalities would contradict one of the LLC's 
most appealing aspects, its design to relieve member-managers from 
the excessive burdens of the formalities required of ... 
[corporations]."301 Accordingly, failure to observe formalities should 
not be used when deciding to pierce the veil of an LLC. However, 
the other aspects of the suggested approach could be applied to 
piercing an LLC's veil in Maryland under appropriate circumstances. 
X. CONCLUSION 
This comment explores Maryland's current approach to piercing 
the corporate veil. After comparing Maryland's approach to a select 
group of five states, Maryland is on the extreme side of piercing the 
corporate veil with their strict veil-piercing test.302 The rule in 
Maryland is "that the corporate entity will be disregarded only when 
necessary to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity."303 
Despite the assertion that Maryland common law allows for the veil 
to be pierced when a paramount equity is present, Maryland courts 
have not found sufficient facts to justify piercing the corporate veil to 
enforce a paramount equity.304 This demonstrates that Maryland 
courts consider a corporation's limited liability protection as being 
more important than protecting victims of shareholders' conduct in 
certain inequitable cases.305 
As a result, this comment recommends that Maryland courts use 
other factors, in addition to fraud, when deciding to disregard a 
corporate entity, including shareholder control, failure to follow 
corporate formalities, and undercapitalization.306 Furthermore, the 
factor of fraud should be relaxed to include misrepresentation or 
conduct that is akin to fraud but does not meet the Maryland courts' 
strict definition of common law fraud. 307 Maryland would benefit 
from a more liberal standard since corporations would be more 
cautious and conduct themselves more appropriately so as to avoid 
the risk of losing the shield of limited liability, which will, in turn, 
301. PRESSER, supra note 93, § 4:2. 
302. See supra Parts V-VI. 
303. Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 654, 382 A.2d 893, 899 (1978) (quoting 
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. App. 295, 312, 340 A.2d 22, 
235 (1975)); see also supra Part VI. 
304. Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 126 Md. 
App. 294, 307, 728 A.2d 783, 789 (1999); see supra Part VI. 
305. See supra Part VI. 
306. See supra Part VIII. 
307. See supra Part VIII.D. 
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confer a benefit upon the community.308 By lowering the standard in 
Maryland to pierce the corporate veil, the courts would better protect 
consumers in the marketplace and care for their individual rights.309 
Accordingly, injured creditors in tort and contract claims would 
benefit from the increased possibility of collecting damages when 




See supra Part VII. 
See supra Part VII.C. 
See supra Part VII.C. 
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